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LEARNING FROM BROWNFIELDS
WENDY E. WAGNER*

Mildly or moderately contaminated sites, commonly referred
to as "brownfields," are undoubtedly one of the most discussed and
reformed environmental problems of the 1990's.' Over the past few
years, nearly forty states have passed legislation aimed at encouraging
redevelopment of brownfields.2 Simultaneously, a flurry of federal
reforms have been initiated by Congress and the EPA. Since 1994,
Congress has considered scores of bills addressing various issues
related to brownfields development' and has actually passed several
into law.' The EPA for its part has launched a multifaceted, multimillion dollar brownfields initiative.5 Even local governments, who
have been bypassed in the implementation and enforcement of most
environmental regulatory programs since the late 1960's, are playing a
prominent leadership role on issues relating to brownfields. These local
efforts often inform and even guide federal and state programs.
*Associate Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. B.A., Hanover
College 1982, M.E.S., Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies 1984, J.D., Yale Law
School 1987. I am grateful to the University of Kentucky Journal of Natural Resources and
Environmental Law for inviting me to participate in this symposium. Thanks also to Jonathan
Entin and Andrew Morriss for offering insightful comments on an earlier draft and to Christina
Tuggey for providing excellent research assistance.
'Brownfields already have two treatise-type books dedicated exclusively to them. See
BROWNFEELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY (Todd
S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds. 1997) [hereinafter BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSiVE GUIDE];
BROWNFIELDS LAW & PRACTICE: THE CLEANUP AND REDEVELOPMENT OF CONTAMINATED LAND
(Michael B. Gerrard ed. 1998).
2See, e.g., BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 1, at chs. 21-50
(outlining state voluntary cleanup legislation on a state-by-state basis); Larry Schnapf, State-byState Survey ofBrownfield And Voluntary Cleanup Programs,28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2488,2488
(1998) (observing and then discussing the "voluntary cleanup programs or brownfield programs"
instituted by "approximately 40 states").
'See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Overview of Federal and State Law Governing
Brownfields Cleanups, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supranote 1, at 27 (listing
legislative proposals targeted at brownfields redevelopment).
4
See, e.g., Taxpayer Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-34 (1997) (brownfields tax incentive
law); Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208 (1996) (lender liability protection law).
5See, e.g., U.S. EPA, BROWNFIELDS ACTION AGENDA (1995).
6
See Bonnie K. Biemer, How a City'sPilot ProjectcanInfluence a State 'sBrownfields
Program, 13.2 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 339 (1998). EPA has encouraged these efforts
by funding over seventy-five economic-redevelopment pilot projects across the country. Each
project receives a grant of up to $200,000 to address problems of contamination. See, e.g.,
Superfiund: Reports Cite Savings in Remedy Selection Resultingfrom Superfund Reform at EPA,
27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1874 (1997).
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Since so much effort is being directed at curing the brownfields
problem, it also seems appropriate to begin to ask the antecedent

questions about why the problem arose in the first place and whether it
could have been avoided or minimized by drafting better legislation.

Brownfields are generally regarded as an unintended consequence of
the two major hazardous waste laws--the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA") and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"). 9 Yet a review of our nearly three decades of environmental

law-making reveals that brownfields are not the only example of
significant, unintended consequences resulting from a prominent
environmental law. For example, acid rain is caused in significant part
by midwestem utilities that erected tall stacks for their sulfur and
nitrogen gas emissions specifically to circumvent the local emission
requirements of the Clean Air Act." Like brownfields, Congress
simply did not foresee the seemingly obvious possibility that in order
to avoid strict local air pollution regulation, some industries (or
utilities) would build taller stacks to disperse the pollution higher into
the atmosphere, well above the state ambient air quality monitors." A
similar story may be told for the disposal of waste on land during the

'See, e.g., Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis, Defining the Brownfields Problem, in
BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENsIvE GuIDE, supra note 1, at 6-8 (relating estimated 130,000 to
450,000 brownfield sites nationwide to the unintended effects of CERCLA and RCRA on
brownfields redevelopments); see infra note 41 and accompanying text.
842 U.S.C. §§ 9601 - 9675. CERCLA, passed in 1980 and amended significantly in
1986 (the Superfund Reauthorization Act (SARA)), targets the remediation of sites where there
has been a release of a hazardous substance which presents a substantial threat to the public health
or welfare or the environment.
942 U.S.C. §§ 6901 - 6992. RCRA, passed originally as the Solid Waste Disposal Act
in 1976 and amended significantly in 1984, establishes a comprehensive regulatory program for
the generation, handling, transportation, and disposal of hazardous wastes. Subtitle I of RCRA
establishes a federal program governing permitting, monitoring, and cleanup of spills from
underground storage tanks which contain either petroleum or hazardous substances.
"0See, e.g., EDWARD TENNER, WHY THINGS BITE BACK: TECHNOLOGY AND THE
REVENGE OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 86 (1996) (describing causal connection between the

Clean Air Act and acid rain); Frances H. Irwin, An IntegratedFrameworkforPreventingPollution
andProtectingthe Environment,22 ENVTL. L. 1, 13 (1992) (same).
"A weak argument can be made that Congress did anticipate this sort of problem in
Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(B), as amended 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(B). See, e.g., Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd in part Train v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975); see generally Arnold W. Reitze, Jr.,
Overview andCritique:A CenturyofAir PollutionControlLaw: What's Worked; What's Failed;
What Might Work, 21 ENvTL. L. 1549, 1597-1601 (1991) (discussing 5th Circuit finding that tall
stacks violated the Clean Air Act, the subsequent Supreme Court case that was "ambiguous on the
use of dispersion techniques such as tall smokestacks,' and EPA's general failure to address the
issue regulatorily).
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early 1970'st2 and air toxics throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

3

While

Congress busily closed off some methods of pollution disposal (like
direct discharge into the water), it left others open and thus essentially
4
encouraged more damaging types of pollution problems.

Curiously, despite their prevalence and significance, these types
of statutory sleepers, 5 referred to here as Unintended Legislative
6
Consequences of Environmental Regulation or ULCERs,' have

"For Congress' post hoc recognition ofthis unintended consequence, see H.R. REP.NO.
94-1491, pt. 1, at 4 (1976) (recognizing during the passage of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act that the "federal government... [spent] billions ofdollars to remove pollutants from
the air and water, only to dispose of such pollutants on the land in an environmentally unsound
manner.").
"3From 1970 to 1990, only seven air toxic standards were promulgated by EPA. The
remaining air toxins (of which there are at least 189) remained unregulated until Congress
amended the Clean Air Act in 1990. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b). It appears that industry took full
advantage of the regulatory gap. Prior to the change in regulation in 1990, firms reported emitting
2.7 billion pounds of air toxics per year. It is estimated that only one-fifth of the total air toxics
emissions were actually reported during this period, bringing the annual emissions total to over 13
billion pounds per year. See S. REP. 101-228, 128 (1989).
"See generallyIrwin, supranote 10, at 12-14 (discussing how fragmentation ofstatutes
leads to the transfer of pollutants to other environmental media). Indeed, even in closing off some
methods of free land disposal in the passage of RCRA and CERCLA, Congress may have still left
open other pathways, such as the groundwater and air. See, e.g., Barry G. Rabe, Legislative
Incapacity:The CongressionalRole in EnvironmentalPolicy-makingandthe Case ofSupernd,
15 J. HEALTH POLS., POL'Y & L. 571,581-82 (1990) (arguing that "it is increasingly evident that
the NPL sites that have received extensive Superfund remediation funding pose serious crossmedia problems, including toxic vaporization from land-based sites and leaching into groundwater
sources. ").

15See, e.g., William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Lesson of the Red Squirrel: Consensus and
Betrayal in the EnvironmentalStatutes, 5 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 161, 169-70 (1989)
(coining the term "sleepers" to refer to "provisions in a bill of enormous practical consequence that
slip through as a result of neglect or other circumstances inherent in the lawmaking process").
"6Professor Rodgers not only coined the term "sleeper" to encompass a whole host of
statutory surprises, see, e.g., id, but he has begun developing a taxonomy of sleepers depending
on whether the consequences that occurred after passage of the statute were unanticipated by the
"formal" legislature (or majority) or unforeseeable because of the passage of time or changes in
circumstances. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Where EnvironmentalLawandBiologyMeet: OfPandas'
Thumbs, StatutorySleepers, andEffective Law, 65 U. CoLO. L. REv. 25, 57-58 (1993) (discussing
two types of sleepers in environmental law). Rodgers uses as examples of the first type of sleeper
provisions like Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act that was inserted by a congressional
staffer. Id. at 58. He refers to the use of the Refuse Act of 1899 in the 1960's to enjoin waste
disposal into navigable waters as an illustration of the second type of sleeper.
The ULCERs at issue in this article, and brownfields in particular, fit within Rodgers'
very general definition of a statutory sleeper since they are indeed an unanticipated consequence
of CERCLA and RCRA. The ULCERs are different from Rodgers' two more specific types of
sleepers, however. First, it appears that the brownfields phenomenon was both completely
unintended and unwanted by the whole of Congress. See, e.g., infra notes 69-74 and
accompanying text. Because of this feature, brownfields do not fit Rodgers' first category of
sleepers that are slyly planted in the legislation without broader congressional awareness. A good
argument can also be made that brownfields were anticipateable. Thus they may also fall out of
the second category of Rodgers' sleepers that by and large seem unforeseeable ex ante.
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received virtually no scholarly attention. 7 Looking back on this
emerging pattern of ULCERs, however, one cannot help but wonder
why these seemingly obvious repercussions of narrowly focused laws

were not anticipated and why Congress appears to be making the same
kinds of mistakes today.
This Article examines the lesson brownfields teaches about the

process of environmental law-making. In the first section, the role
CERCLA and RCRA play in bringing about the brownfields problem
is explored. In the second section, the reasons Congress may have

made this rather profound legislative mistake are discussed. Reforms
that should improve Congress' lawmaking without introducing an
entirely new sequence of unintended consequences are proposed in the

third and final section.
I. THE ROLE OF FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS IN CREATING THE
BROWNFIELDS PROBLEM

Because of their general unattractiveness and often undesirable
location, brownfields would not exactly be fast-moving real estate even

if no environmental legislation had been passed. Yet CERCLA's
pronouncement in 1980 that any site where there is a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance can be subject to an
expensive cleanup was likely the final nail in the coffin for the
redevelopment of many of these marginal areas. 8 Ironically, then, the
environmental laws that heralded a new view of land use and

"Infact, Jay Wexler points out this same oversight in his critique of Edward Tenner's
book on Unintended Consquences, supra note 10: '[I]t is unfortunate that Tenner does not
distinguish between unintended consequences that arise out of human shortsightedness and those
that arise out of the impenetrability of natural systems.... In the case of the smokestacks, it is
certainly possible to argue that regulators should have and could have foreseen the consequences
of building larger stacks." Jay D. Wexler, Book Review: W7ry Things Bite Back: Technology and
the Revenge of Unintended Consequences, by Edward Tenner, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 334,335-36
(1997). This distinction between the chaos of natural systems and the chaos arising from human
shortsightedness may also be an important distinction for the analysis of Ruhl & Ruh[ discussed
at infra note 84.
sSee, e.g.. William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose: Voluntary Contamination
Cleanup Approvals, Incentives, and the Costs oflnterminable Liability, 80 MINN. L. REV 35, 5052 (1995) (explaining this adverse effect of potential liability under CERCLA on real estate
transactions); E. Lynn Grayson & Stephen A.K. Palmer, The Brownfields Phenomenon: An
Analysis of Environmental, Economic, and Community Concerns, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10337, 10337 (1995) (observing that "[rneal estate developers cite potential liability for
environmental contamination as a major impediment to redeveloping these vacant or abandoned
sites.") (footnotes omitted).
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stewardship also appear to be responsible for deterring the remediation
of past environmental misdeeds.
This situation arises because CERCLA, and to a lesser extent
RCRA, impose heavy penalties on all parties connected with
contaminated lands, but offer no rewards to the few within this group
who contribute to the cleanup of these blighted areas. CERCLA is
predominantly a liability statute that makes no pretense of being
judicious in its approach. It establishes a super-aggressive liability
scheme that holds virtually everyone who has had significant contact
with the contaminated site strictly and jointly and severally liable.'
2
RCRA, predominantly a regulatory statute, is not much better. " It
generally serves only to reinforce CERCLA's broad liability rules and
adds petroleum to the list of contaminants of concern.2 '
The chilling effects of these unforgiving liability rules on real
estate transactions involving even mildly contaminated lands may be
substantial.22 Investors and sellers face considerable legal uncertainties
in determining when or what kind of cleanup is necessary.23 Scientific
uncertainties in characterizing the contamination at a site expand the
range of possible cleanup costs still further. As a result, a contaminated
property may be difficult to value. Price estimates may range from the
negative to the positive figures. Only the most uninformed buyers or
risk tolerant, privately financed entrepreneurs will purchase these lands
without the benefit of additional legal and financial incentives.
9
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (setting out list of liable parties).
2°RCRA, for example, requires corrective action for contaminated land and provides
citizens with an injunctive claim against the owner of a contaminated site if it presents an
"imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment," 42 U.S.C. §6972(a)(1)(B),
or when disposal of wastes occurs in violation of RCRA. Id. § 6972(a)(1)(A). Despite these
claims, however, RCRA has been read by the Supreme Court to preclude citizen suits for
reimbursement of cleanup costs against other parties. Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 1179
(1996). The best and possibly only statutory claim available in this situation (provided that the
contaminant is not petroleum) is under CERCLA. See, e.g, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(0)(1).
"See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991, 6991a, 6991b.
"Actually, perhaps in ways similar to environmental justice concerns, there is scant
empirical evidence to document the scope or magnitude of the cause and effect between CERCLA
and RCRA on the one hand and developer aversion to mildly or moderately contaminated lands
on the other hand. Pers. Communication with Prof.Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law (June 2, 1998).
"3See, e.g., James T. O'Reilly, Environmental Racism, Site Cleanup and Inner City
Jobs: Indiana's Urban In-fill Incentives, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 43,49, 52,55 (1994) (observing that
CERCLA and RCRA "are fraught with uncertainties that erect barriers to recycling manufacturing
sites in the inner city," including notification requirements and potential criminal liability). Id. at
49. For a succinct discussion of the reluctance of sellers to transfer properties because of the fear
of subsequent cleanup liabilities, see Julia A. Solo, Comment, Urban Decay and the Role of
Superfund: Legal Barriers to Redevelopment and Prospectsfor Change, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 285,
302 (1995).
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There are at least four specific ways that CERCLA and RCRA
complicate quantification of cleanup costs or possible cleanup
liabilities.24 First, the statutes generally do not contain any threshold
concentrations below which a site is no longer deemed hazardous or
subject to cleanup liability.25 CERCLA, for example, warns that any
area where there is a "release or a threat of a release of a hazardous

substance" is a candidate for a CERCLA cleanup, leaving the
impression that only at sites that are completely contamination-free can
owners or operators breathe freely.26 The legislative history confirms
that Congress endeavored to err on the side of overinclusiveness, with
little to no awareness of the lack of predictability that such a sweeping

definition created for those (government and potentially liable parties
alike) who might seek to engage in socially desirable revitalization
projects for mildly or moderately contaminated lands that fit within this
broad definition."

Second, and exacerbating the first source of legal uncertainty,
is the failure of the statutes, CERCLA in particular, to give any

"For a more detailed general discussion of these and other factors, see Joel B. Eisen,
"Brownflields of Dreams"?: Challenges and Limits of Voluntary Cleanup Programs and
Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883, 898-913; Solo, supra note 23, at 287-88 (listing factors in
Superfund that pose barriers to redevelopment of urban properties).
'Sites potentially subject to cleanup under CERCLA or RCRA include:
(1) any place where a non-naturally occurring hazardous substance has "come to be
located" if that hazardous substance is entering or threatens to enter the environment without a
permit. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(9)(B), 9601(10), 9604(a)(3)(A), 9607(a), 96070). If a reportable
quantity of the hazardous substance has been released into the environment without a permit, the
person in charge is also required to notify the National Response Center of the release. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9602(b), 9603; 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1997).
(2) any site where petroleum has been disposed if the petroleum presents an "imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 42 U.S.C. §§6972(a)(l)(B), 6973(a).
(3) an underground storage tank which is leaking a hazardous substance or petroleum
product. Id. § 6991(1) - (2). Owners and operators of underground storage tanks containing
petroleum or hazardous substances must report all releases or suspected releases within 24 hours
of the suspected release. 40 C.F.R. § 280.50 (1997).
(4) a building containing asbestos which will be subject to renovation or demolition or
which has loose asbestos which poses a health hazard to workers within the building or violates
state or local regulations. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001(b)-(f) (1997); 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.141, 61.145
(1997).
'See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). See also United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 900
F.2d 429, 438 (lst Cir. 1990) (holding that cleanup can be commenced at a site where
concentrations of hazardous substances exceed background levels); HRW Sys., Inc. v. Washington
Gas Light Co., 823 F. Supp. 318, 340-41 (D. Md. 1993) (holding that presence of any detectable
amount ofhazardous substance is sufficient for proofof"disposal" and "release" under CERCLA);
but see Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 670 (5th Cir. 1989) (liability for cleanup
under CERCLA does not occur until concentrations of contaminants at the site exceed CERCLA
cleanup standards).
27See, e.g., infra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
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8
meaningful endpoint to what constitutes a final cleanup. Even if an
eager developer or well-meaning municipality were to purchase and
clean up a site, there is great difficulty determining "how clean is
clean."29 Congress provided only the vaguest directions in guiding this
inquiry.3" EPA exacerbated the problem with a highly site-specific and

2
See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 18, at 58-61 (discussing the limited substantive
guidance provided by CERCLA and resulting regulations in determining "how clean is clean");
Eisen, supra note 24, at 907 (observing that "it is nearly impossible to determine in advance the
required level or cost of a cleanup under CERCLA."). The redevelopment community has also
expressed concern about the stringency of cleanup standards and the failure of EPA to adequately
account for future uses of the land. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL FINANCIAL ADVISORY

BOARD PUBLICATIONS, EXPEDITING CLEAN-UP AND REDEVELOPMENT OF BROWNFIELDS:

ADDRESSING THE MAJOR BARRIERS TO PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT-REAL OR PERCEIVED 6
(visited May 18, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/efinpage/bmcle.htm> (arguing that "Superfund
standards are perceived as inappropriate for many Brownfields sites that are not, or may not be,
seriously contaminated and where human and environmental exposure can be limited through
various mechanisms.").
For the cleanup of leaks from underground petroleum tanks or PCB spills, by contrast,
the guidance is much more specific in determining cleanup levels. For petroleum leaking from
underground storage tanks, federal cleanup standards are based on a site-specific, risk-based
exposure assessment. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.60-.66,280.71 (1997). (For cleanup of spills
from underground storage tanks containing hazardous substances, a more detailed series of
investigations may be required. 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.60-66 (1997)). If the only source of
contamination is PCBs, stringent cleanup standards are set forth by the EPA in their "PCB Spill
Policy," which generally require soils and surfaces to be cleaned to a concentration of 10 to 50
ppm, depending on the surface. 40 C.F.R. § 761.125 (1997). Although stringent, they bring the
advantage of finality. Compliance with EPA's PCB Spill Policy creates a presumption against the
need for further cleanup if the spill response requirements have been followed and if the cleanup
standards have been met. Id § 761.135(a) (1997).
"9 Cleanup standards under CERCLA are "highly variable." See Buzbee, supra note 18,
at 47, 59 & n.32 ("Without government feedback about the type and extent of necessary cleanup,
efforts to determine liabilities associated with contaminated land are fraught with uncertainty");
see also JAMES BOYD ET AL., THE IMPACT OF UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY ON
INDUSTRIAL REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT: DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 21 (1994)

(noting that cleanup standards depend heavily on unique perspectives of state and federal agencies
involved in any particular cleanup); Grayson & Palmer, supranote 18, at 10339 (observing great
variation in numerical standards and risk assessment procedures used for cleanups and also stating
that developers' fears of "future changes in environmental laws or improvements in technology"
exacerbate 'how clean is clean' uncertainty); Davis & Margolis, supra note 7, at 9 (actual risk of
liability is difficult to determine under CERCLA).
Private parties conducting a voluntary cleanup are not, however, required to follow the
standards and guidelines of CERCLA unless they are under a state or federal order demanding
them to do so. Nevertheless, the fear of government action, coupled with the desire of many
private parties to maximize the potential for cost recovery from third parties, often leads them to
ensure that they have substantially complied with the cleanup requirements of CERCLA set forth
in the National Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. Part 300 (1997). See also 40 C F.R. §
300.700(c)(3)(i) (1997) (requiring that private parties establish that their cleanups are in
"substantial compliance" with the NCP in order to recover reimbursement from other parties under
the broad liability rules of CERCLA).
"0See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b), (d). Again the legislative history suggests that
Congress thought cleanup standards were a technical, site-specific decision that could be left to
the EPA.
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nearly intellectually impenetrable process for determining cleanup
standards. 3' Since EPA has resources sufficient to oversee cleanups

only at the very worst sites in the nation, the application of these
guidelines to sites with low or moderate levels of contamination is left
to the states and risk-tolerant private parties. Thus, brownfields
redevelopers will not only be unclear whether a site requires cleanup,
but they will be unclear as to what type of cleanup will be legally
sufficient.

Third, all who have any meaningful contact with the site are
theoretically liable for cleanup costs under the statute.32 New owners
3

Standards for cleanup under the National Contingency Plan must meet federal and
state promulgated standards and, in most cases, a determination that the risk posed by the site does
not exceed a minimum of I X 10' risk. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.400(g)(2),300.430(e)(2)(i)(A),
300.430(e)(2)(i)(D) (1997). Although the regulations are short, the guidances are long and difficult
to follow. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, CERCLA COMPLIANCE WITH OTHER LAwS MANUAL, OSWER
9234.1-01 (March 6, 1988); U.S. EPA, CERCLACOMPLANCE WITH OTHERLAWS MANUAL: PART
II. CLEAN AIR ACT AND OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES AND STATE REQUIREMENTS, OSWER
9234.1-02 (August 1989); U.S. EPA, RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDANCE FOR SUPERFUND, VOLUME I.
HUMAN HEALTH EVALUATION MANUAL (PART A), INTERIM FINAL, EPA/540/1-891002 (December
1989). There has been a great deal of commentary about the uncertainty involved in both the
selection of the applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements [ARARs] and the attainment
of the target risk levels. See, e.g., Stephen Merrill Smith, CERCLA Compliancewith RCRA: The
Labyrinth, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10518, 10524-25 (1988) (observing how only the
most highly trained EPA personnel can navigate the ARAR determinations with any confidence).
Observers of the federal remediation process have also observed that cost considerations, rather
than rigid science, often determine the cleanup goals. See, e.g., CLEAN SITES, IMPROVING REMEDY
SELECTION: AN EXPLICIT AND INTERACTIVE PROCESS FOR THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM at B-14

(October 1990) (identifying "[n]umerous problems associated with the criteria and the remedy
selection process" including "inconsistency in decisionmaking, inconsistency in compliance with
ARARs, lack of clear cleanup objectives, inadequate characterization of risk at sites, inadequate
attention to environmental protection, inappropriate use of cost criterion, failure to implement
permanent and treatment remedies, poor justification for selected remedies, and selection of
unproven technologies."); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ARE WE CLEANING Up? TEN
SUPERFUND CASE STUDIES 10 (1988) ("It is not uncommon to have a multimillion-dollar cleanup
decision made without any technical data to support it, either from the technical literature or from
tests done on site material."); Donald A. Brown, EPA's Resolution of the Conflict Between
CleanupCosts and the Law inSetting CleanupStandardsUnderSuperfund, 15 CoLUM.J. ENVrL.
L. 241 (1990) (same).
The cleanup standards promulgated under RCRA are similarly site-specific. For
example, corrective action at a RCRA Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal facility
is currently determined on a case-by-case basis by the EPA. See, e.g., Corrective Action for Solid
Waste Management Units (SWMUs) at Hazardous Waste Management Facilities, 55 Fed. Reg.
30,798 (1990). Remediation levels for corrective actions appear generally to be based on Action
Levels set forth in EPA's proposed corrective action regulations and/or on a cumulative risk range
of between 10 to I 0', although ARARs will not guide the how clean is clean decision. See, e.g.,
id at 30,824.
"'See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(a)(1)(B), 6973 (panics subject to liability under RCRA
imminent hazard provisions include those who "contributed" or are "contributing to" the "past or
present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste
which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment"); id
§ 9607(a)(l)-(4) (listing parties potentially liable under CERCLA). These broad liability
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who purchase a brownfield site with the best intentions of cleaning up
the site and revitalizing the neighborhood are still liable if the planned
cleanup is not quite enough. 3 Indeed, the strictjoint and several nature
of CERCLA liability leaves a new owner with the theoretical possibility
that he may be liable for the entire cost of cleanup if the other
4
The
potentially liable parties are not found or are insolvent.

provisions not only threaten liability for prospective purchasers, but also might discourage sellers
from transferring contaminated sites for fear of liability for a subsequent cleanup. The Fourth
Circuit, in fact, has held that even non-culpable past owners of a site are liable for cleanup costs
under CERCLA provided that the contamination was present during their ownership and passively
moved through the site. Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 846 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 940 (1992) (holding past owners liable during periods of passive
leaking of contaminants occurring during their ownership); but see Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. Koppers
Co., 40 F.3d 750 (5th Cir. 1994) (declining to hold intermediate owner liable under CERCLA
where intermediate owner did not operate facility or actively dispose of hazardous substances at
site). Obtaining a comprehensive indemnification clause from the purchaser for all future
environmental liabilities may protect the seller to the extent the purchaser remains solvent, but the
courts have consistently held that an indemnification clause does not protect a covered party from
liability to the government or other defendants. John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401,
407 (1st Cir. 1993) (indemnity agreement will not protect responsible party from suit by
government or private party under CERCLA § 107(a)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (1994)
(same).
Finally, in very limited instances, lenders who foreclosed on a property have been held
liable as owners under CERCLA or as operators regardless of foreclosure if they participated in
the management of a facility that disposed of the hazardous wastes. United States v. Maryland
Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986) (holding bank that foreclosed and
purchased facility liable as owner under CERCLA); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d
1550, 1557 (1Ith Cir. 1990), cert.denied 498 U.S. 1046 (1991) (holding lender liable as operator
for decisions which reflected capacity to control waste disposal of borrower who was directly
responsible for contamination at site). In an effort to provide more predictability to the lending
community, EPA promulgated a rule clarifying CERCLA liability with regard to lenders and
limiting it only to circumstances in which the lender actively managed the facility. National Oil
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 57 Fed.
Reg. 18,344 (April 29, 1992). After a series of events threatened the rulemaking, Congress
interceded and passed the Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection
Act of 1996, supra note 4, which amended CERCLA and codified the EPA's lender liability rule.
This should provide lenders with considerable comfort with regard to their potential CERCLA
liability for traditional lending activities. Lenders nevertheless have had understandable reluctance
to finance brownfield purchases because of the possibility of losing all collateral value on a
contaminated site that is later determined to require expensive cleanup.
33
With the exception of: 1) state and local governments who acquire a property
involuntarily, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D), and 2) purely "innocent" landowners who have made a
very thorough, good faith investigation of the site prior to purchase and mistakenly believe the site
to be clean, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A), 9607(b)(3), all current owners and operators of a
browfield where a hazardous substance is released or likely to be released can be held liable under
CERCLA and RCRA for the full cost of cleanup. Since liability of the owner attaches at the time
the property is transferred, a prospective purchaser can avoid liability only by ensuring the cleanup
has been completed prior to taking title.
"As mentioned in supranote 33, a purchaser who conducted a thorough investigation
of a site and mistakenly concludes that it is clean has in theory a potential statutory escape from
liability for cleanup. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35), 9607(b)(3). In practice, however, the courts have
proven very reluctant to grant an innocent owner exception, either because a pre-purchase
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legislative history reflects that Congress was determined to maximize
the number of potentially liable parties (and sources of cleanup funds),
again only with the worst sites on their minds."
Fourth and finally, there appears to be no non-judicial process
for resolving questions one, two, and three in favor of a brownfields
redeveloper, even when it is beyond question that the project decreases
the health risks posed by a site and serves the public interest: virtually

anyone can file suit to demand cleanup or other contamination-related
claims. 6 Only in the most extraordinary cases or at the worst sites can
a private party get at least partial confirmation from the U.S. EPA
regarding the adequacy of their voluntary cleanup."

Thus, those

investigation was deemed incomplete, United States v. A & N Cleaners & Launderers, Inc., 854
F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), or because an owner did not take sufficient action to mitigate the
spread of contamination once it was discovered. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal
Co., 14 F.3d 321 (7th Cir. 1994) (innocent owner defense rejected where owner failed to take
precautions to prevent damage from known hazardous substances). This harsh treatment of nonculpable purchasers is offset to some extent by the fact that these purchasers frequently pay a
relatively small portion of cleanup costs if other solvent potentially responsible parties have been
identified. Jersey City Redev. Auths. v. PPG Indus., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,364,
20,368 (D.N.J. 1987), affd, 866 F.2d 1411 (3rd Cir. 1988) (zero percent share for current
landowner who was liable under CERCLA but had no responsibility for the dumping).
"See infra notes 60, 61-66 and accompanying text.
'Under CERCLA and RCRA, a number of different parties may bring an action for
cleanup, even when the site is moderately or even mildly contaminated. These include:
(1) U.S. EPA: The U.S. EPA has jurisdiction over all contaminated sites, although
typically it restricts its enforcement and cleanup activities to the worst sites in the nation-those
identified as high priority (National Priorities List) or identified as presenting an "imminent
hazard" under RCRA. The EPA does, however, retain an enforcement presence in states without
an authorized hazardous waste program or where the contamination has been disposed of in
violation of RCRA. 42 U.S.C. § 6928;
(2) States: States generally have multiple authorities that provide them with the ability
to initiate cleanup or file enforcement actions seeking cleanup at moderately or even mildly
contaminated sites. Even if astate does not have its own statutory program or delegated RCRA
program, a state, like a private citizen can initiate cost recovery actions for cleanups under
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), or seek to require owners to clean up sites that present an
"imminent hazard" or are otherwise in violation of RCRA and involve the unpermitted release of
hazardous waste. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6929, 6972(a); and
(3) Private Parties: Private parties can initiate cleanup actions or seek reimbursement
of their expenses against potentially responsible parties when: 1) a site presents an "imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment," id.§ 6972(a)(1)(B); 2) disposal of wastes
occurs in violation of RCRA, id. § 6972(a)(1)(A); or 3) they seek contribution for the costs they
have incurred in conducting the cleanup. Id. §§ 9607(a), 9613(0(1).
"Pursuant to its Brownfields Agenda, supra note 5, EPA endeavors to provide liability
waivers--termed Prospective Purchaser Agreements-to prospective purchasers ofcontaminated
sites. These agreements are intended to eliminate the legitimate liability concerns that potential
purchasers face in purchasing brownfields sites. Yet despite some improvements in the potential
availability of prospective purchaser agreements under EPA's new 1995 policy, these agreements
areoffered only to the purchasers of NPL sites or sites where EPA has taken or anticipates to take
a response action, and even then the agreements are not recommended for purchasers in a hurry.
EPA's prospective purchaser agreements may also offer incomplete protection unless skilled
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owning, buying, or financing these sites-even if a cleanup is part of
the investment plan-must take their chances. They are assured the site
is clean under the statute only by the absence of lawsuits or regulatory
actions filed against them." The legislative history supporting this
broad right to sue again reinforces Congress' fear of EPA malfeasance
or inaction,39 with no appreciation for the opposite effect such litigation
might have in discouraging the revitalization of mildly or moderately
contaminated sites.

In sum, there are layers of statutory provisions that preclude
reliable quantification of cleanup or liability costs at a brownfields site.
Depending on the level of contamination at the site, the cleanup

estimates can vary by several areas of magnitude, making the value of
the property difficult to determine. As a result, the rational response by
prospective purchasers is avoidance.
11. How

COULD CONGRESS HAVE MADE THIS MISTAKE?

The brownfields problem, to the extent that its origins have

been discussed at all, is consistently regarded as an unfortunate
inevitability of complex law-making. Nobody in Congress intended the
brownfields problem. Thus, the reasoning goes, the brownfields
problem could not have been anticipated."

counsel is hired by a potentially responsible party to negotiate them. For example, EPA does not
automatically provide: contribution protection from other potential plaintiffs such as state
governments, private parties and natural resources trustees; equivalent protection from suits under
RCRA; or liability protection that is transferable to subsequent purchasers and lenders. See, e.g.,
Buzbee, supra note 18, at 80.
Other EPA reforms attempt to allay the concerns of prospective purchasers, although
these fall far short of providing purchasers with indemnification from future liability to the
government or private parties for cleanup costs. These reforms include the development of a
guidance pledging not to pursue innocent owners of land with contaminated aquifers, EPA Policy
Toward Owners of Property Containing Contaminated Aquifers (November 1995), and the
issuance of "comfort letters" to sellers and buyers conducting voluntary cleanups, in which EPA
provides assurance that it does not intend to take enforcement action at the site. EPA Region I
Announces Measuresto Speed Cleanupof Waste Sites, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) 35 (Feb.
22, 1995).
3'See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 18, at 47-48 ("For over a decade,.. . neither the federal
political branches nor EPA created any program or policy to review and approve voluntary
cleanups.").39
See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
This premise will be explored only with regard to CERCLA, widely regarded as the
most significant cause of the brownfields problem,
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The factual premise-that Congress did not intend or anticipate
the brownfields problem-appears true. 4

Although passage of

CERCLA in 1980 and its amendments in 1986 were certainly fraught
with controversies, even the most vigorous opponents of the legislation
seemed to have missed the brownfields flaw.

The separate conclusion-that because Congress did not intend
the brownfields problem it therefore could not have been anticipatedis less clear.42

Although we will probably never know whether

brownfields were unforeseeable to Congress in 1980, for purposes of
legal reform, there are at least three reasons to assume that the

brownfields problem could have been anticipated. First, brownfields
are a patently obvious consequence of broad liability rules, and it is thus
unclear why they were so unforeseeable to Congress. Although data on

contaminated lands was sparse, even in 1980 common sense should have
alerted congresspersons to the fact that mildly and moderately

contaminated lands would not be attractive to redevelopers because of
the broad reach of CERCLA's liability, which included the liability of
current owners.43 Second, there is considerable evidence ofdeficiencies

in Congress' deliberations during the enactment of CERCLA and
SARA. This evidence increases the likelihood that some foreseeable
problems fell through the legislative cracks." Third, the job of legal
reformers is to propose ways to improve the system. Classifying

brownfields as unforeseeable given considerable evidence to the

"For concurring conclusions in the legal literature, see, e.g., Thomas G. Kessler,
Comment, The Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation StandardsAct: Pennsylvania
Tells CERCLA Enough is Enough, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 161, 171 n.48 (1997) (discussing and
citing literature that regards brownfields as an "unintended result" of federal environmental laws);
J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modern Administrative States: Using
Complexity Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and IncreasingRisks the Burgeoningof
Law Posesto Society, 30 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 405,424-25 (1997) (observing how the liability rules
of the federal Superfund law "led completely unexpectedly to the widespread 'brownfields'
problem"); Solo, supra note 23, at 286 (observing that "Superfund has .. had a number of
unintended effects, the most serious being to dissuade industry from redeveloping on former
industrial land.") (footnotes omitted).
'For discussions that seem to lead to this conclusion, see J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory
as a Paradigmfor the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-up Call for Legal
Reductionism andthe ModernAdministrativeState, 45 DUKEL.J. 849,883-84(1996) (suggesting
that the brownfields problem was a non-obvious backfire of CERCLA).
43See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
"Many of these factors might also explain other unwanted features ofCERCLA that
have commanded the attention of legal scholars. See, e.g., John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA's
Mistakes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1405 (1997) (examining the various types ofdrafting errors
made by Congress in CERCLA).
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contrary prevents reformers from addressing an important pattern of
legislative errors that may be capable of being avoided in the future.45
In the remainder of this section, various deficiencies in
Congress' deliberations on CERCLA and the 1986 amendments are
explored in greater depth. Understanding why Congress failed to
anticipate brownfields not only sheds light on whether this particular
problem was in fact capable of being foreseen, it also provides a guide
for future reform efforts directed at minimizing the ULCER
phenomenon. Five explanations for why Congress failed to anticipate
brownfields are offered.
Undoubtedly one of the most important factors explaining why
Congress failed to anticipate the brownfields problem was the dearth of
vocal constituencies or lobbying groups-both within and outside of
Congress-concerned with the problem. 6 The legislative process is
exceptionally well suited to fleshing out the consequences of proposed

'Even assuming that Congress should have anticipated the brownfields problem during
its 1980 deliberations of CERCLA, the question of whether unintended, but anticipateable
consequences of legislation can or should be reformed remains. Again, following the model of the
optimistic reformer, some possible avenues for improvement are discussed in Part III infra. For
a challenge to this position, see infra note 84.
46 One environmental lobbyist involved in the passage of CERCLA confessed that he
"got hit in the back of the head by the boomerang ofunintended consequences" and did not "want
to drive new industrial development into pristine rural areas while leaving vacant urban sites to
decay." Denis Hayes, Anniversary Remarks: Environmental Law and Millennial Politics, 25
ENVrL. L. 953,960(1995). The involvement ofthe real estate community appeared to occur only
after CERCLA was passed, with lobbying efforts focused almost exclusively on obtaining reduced
liability for innocent purchasers and greater certainty with regard to the reach ofCERCLA liability.
It is not clear the extent towhich the real estate community was involved in the 1986 amendments,
although the "innocent landowner defense" added to CERCLA in the 1986 SARA amendments
was a result of the attention drawn to an unfortunate real estate transaction by the Grant Gear
Company in Massachusetts. See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. 11,159 (1985) (statement of Rep.
Moaldey). The real estate community did appear to become very active in the late 1980s however.
In 1989, for example, Representative Weldon of Pennsylvania proposed amendments to the
innocent landowner defense that were intended to provide considerably greater certainty regarding
the reach ofliability for the real estate community. For explanations, discussions, and refinements
of this bill that consistently refer to the real estate community as the primary beneficiaries, see
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK IN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: THE INNOCENT LANDOWNER DEFENSE

Leo Motiuk ed. 1989). In fact, it appears that an environmental audit
212-13, 246, 252 (1.
consulting group serving the commercial real estate community played a large role in drafting the
original Weldon bill. See id. at 235-36 (correspondence from Environmental Audit, Inc. and from
substantial role in drafting the bill).
Representative Weldon referencing Environmental Audit Inc.'s
Other current lobbyists on the brownfields problem, primarily local and state
governments, largely appear to have responded to these same developers' calls for help. Their
interest was undoubtedly also triggered by EPA's response, which was the creation of locallyfocused redevelopment grants and incentives program. See supra note 6.
For a general discussion ofthe policy errors that can occur when there are no organized
stakeholders for important policy positions, see KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE

ORGANIZATION 76-103 (1991) (discussing the incentives congresspersons have for seeking
information and how constituency or self-interest produces most policy-relevant information).

J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.

[VOL. 13:2

bills when interest groups are involved.47 Indeed, a number of
seemingly unanticipateable consequences were highlighted and
addressed in CERCLA, a fact that is not only supported by its rich
legislative history but by the intricate exceptions woven into the
statute.48 Yet in the case of brownfields, as well as with other similar

sorts of recurring legislative errors,49 Congress' failure to anticipate
problems is likely a partial result of the absence of any organized
interest groups calling Congress' attention to them. Thus, because there
were no incentives for either opponents or proponents of CERCLA to
modify draft legislation to prevent this foreseeable future problem, the
brownfields problem occupied a spot in the political backwater of the
debate about contaminated sites.

Reference to the conditions of CERCLA's passage in 1980
support the likelihood that the brownfields problem occupied a blind

spot in virtually all of the activated interest groups' sight lines.
Opponents of the statute had more to lose than to gain by raising the
brownfields problem. Much of their opposition to CERCLA was based
on the argument that the number and risks of contaminated sites
nationwide had been grossly exaggerated.5" Making the brownfields
argument would have only reinforced the doomsday predictions of
CERCLA supporters who projected that contaminated sites numbered

in the thousands or tens of thousands nationwide. By contrast, other
possible opponents to CERCLA who were much more likely to be
4
Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of"Muddling Through", 19 PuB. ADMIN. REv, 79,
85 (1959) (arguing that "[w]ithout claiming that every interest has a sufficiently powerful
watchdog, it can be argued that our [interest group dominated] system often can assure a more
comprehensive regard for the values of the whole society than any attempt at intellectual
comprehensiveness.").
"3For a few examples, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(9) (exceptions to what constitutes
a "facility"); 9601(22) (exceptions to what constitutes a "release"), 9601(33) (exceptions to what
constitutes a "pollutant or contaminant"); 9603(e) (notification exemption for pesticide
application); see also 126 CONG. REC. 30,950 (1980) (discussing liability limits added to the
statute during the conference proceedings for releases involving motor vehicles, aircraft, pipelines,
or rolling stock that were ofconcem to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation)
(statement of Senator Cannon).
49
See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Congress,Science, and Environmental Policy, U. ILL.
L. REV. Part lil.C.2.(b) (forthcoming 1999).
°See, e.g., MARC K. LANDY ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY:
ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS 159 (1990) (recounting that a major opponent to CERCLA was
the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) who "adopted an adversarial posture" and
"disputed EPA's assessment of the extent of the problem of abandoned sites and of the risks they
posed"); id. at 162 (noting that industries' challenge to the number and general riskiness of
abandoned waste sites "was discredited because it was too obviously self-serving"); id. at 164
(describing CMA and other opponents as failing to mount a "carefully reasoned challenge to EPA's
account of the facts" and noting that CMA's "hardball tactics" "helped undermine the credibility
of whatever information it did provide")-
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affected by the brownfields problem, like industrial real estate interests,
appear not to have been organized or aware of the liability provisions
during the early legislative debates. 5' Instead, the chilling effect of
were
CERCLA liability rules on industrial real estate transactions
2
realized only after the statute was passed and implemented.1
Those promoting the statute also may have missed, either
deliberately or inadvertently, the implications of broad liability rules for
real estate transactions. EPA acted essentially as an interest group in
favor of CERCLA, exerting a tremendous influence first in drafting and
then in shepherding CERCLA though Congress.53 Yet EPA's primary
motivations appear to have revolved around its determination to expand
its regulatory turf, while at the same time "strengthen[ing] its 'antitoxic
hazard' orientation." 4 To this end, EPA sought broad liability
provisions and balked at legislative limits that would exempt mildly
contaminated sites.5" Finally, although not an interest group in the strict
sense, at least some members of Congress appeared to view CERCLA
as essentially pork-barrel legislation that offered the possibility for

"See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott t al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The
FederalizationofEnvironmentalLaw, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 320 (1985) (recounting theory
of "bounded rationality" in organizations that predicts that "the vast majority of industrial
corporations would not be set up to monitor federal environmental legislation until after they were
affected by it."). Some of these diffused interests did begin to coalesce by the late 1980's, after
CERCLA's impact on real estate became clear. See supra note 46.
"See supra note 46. This different constellation of stakes ex ante and ex post for
certain key stakeholders has been identified as particularly troublesome for the legislative branch.
NErK KOMESAR, IMPERFECTALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTiONS INLAW, ECONOMICS, AND

PuBLIc PoucY chpt. 6 (1994) (arguing that the different ex post/ex ante distribution of stakes for
tort victims makes the legislative process institutionally inferior to the courts because the victim
stakeholders do not recognize until after their injury the importance of fair liability rules).
"3See, e.g., LANDY ET AL, supra note 50, at 162 (describing EPA's prominent role in
]
drafting original CERCLA bill and that "[d espite Superfund's torturous route to passage, the basic
elements of the original EPA draft remained intact," including the liability scheme and the
definition of release); id. at 164 (observing that fragmentation in Congress and the complexity of
the issue required Congress to rely heavily on EPA for the basic facts and figures about
contaminated sites).
'Id at 166. See also id. at 141-142 and 166-67 (describing EPA officials' pursuit of
"bureaucratic advantage" in promoting the passage ofCERCLA, which would bring with it "new
responsibilities and resources for their agency").
55See id. at 167 (EPA opposed a "cogent scheme for priority setting" because it
"believed these questions to be so complex and subtle that opening them up for congressional
consideration would provide the allies of industry with myriad opportunities for obfuscation and
delay."); see also id. at 144 (EPA proposed a very broad definition of "release" that "was far
broader than was needed to solve the problems"), id. at 146 (the EPA draft of CERCLA provided
no guidance for determining "which sites to clean up first and how much to cleanup any particular
location").
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channeling federal dollars to their home districts.5 6 To the extent this
attitude prevailed, members of Congress would presumably avoid
clarifying which sites would not receive Superfund monies or federal
involvement.
Thus, Congress is exceptionally good at anticipating a whole
variety of seemingly freakish, long-term consequences of proposed
legislation when assisted by attentive interest groups. However,
Congress appears to have an insufficiently developed process for
apprehending consequences that are not of immediate concern to
organized lobbyist groups, but which will have foreseeable
consequences to the public at large." CERCLA appears to be a case in
point. Interest groups on both sides of the issues, as well as members
of congress themselves, appeared to have had little incentive to look for
and hence find the brownfields ULCER looming in CERCLA's future.
Other features of congressional deliberations serve only to

exacerbate this tendency to focus on the immediate concerns of the
general public and resourceful lobbyists. Perhaps most difficult to

reform is the early framing problem that is intrinsic to virtually all types
of legislative deliberations.58 A variety of social scientists have
observed that once a problem is framed, that frame can define the
problem in ways that are never revisited, for both political and
intellectual reasons. 59 Predictably, a frame that is hastily constructed

"See id. at 158 (describing Senator Long, from Louisiana, who was allied with the
chemical industry and opposed to CERCLA, as becoming a general supporter after receiving a
mailgram from the Louisiana attorney general "claiming that their state had more need than any
other of the assistance that Superfund would provide in 'cleaning up hideous and life threatening
waste dumps'"); see also id. at 142, 153 (describing as one of the strategies to gain support for
CERCLA keeping a running tally of the abandoned, contaminated sites in each congresspersons'
home district).
57See, e.g., DAvID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 137 (1974)
(observing that "Congress will be reluctant to legislate new programs benefitting the unorganized
over the opposition of the organized").
"See generally Paul Slovic et al., Behavioral Decision Theory Perspectiveson Risk
and Safety, 56 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 183, 184 (1984) (people's perceptions of risk are often "at
the mercy of the way that ... information is presented"); see also N. S. Fagley & Paul M. Miller,
The Effect ofFramingon Choice:Interactionswith Risk-Taking Propensity,Cognitive Style, and
Sex, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 496 (1990) (providing empirical support for
framing problem).
59See, e.g., DONALD A. SCHON & MARTIN REIN, FRAME REFLECTION: TOWARD THE
RESOLUTION OF INTRACTABLE POLICY CONTROVERSIES 23 (1994) (arguing that "policy positions
... rest[] on underlying structures of belief, perception, and appreciation, which we call 'frames"'
and that "the frames that shape policy positions and underlie controversy are usually tacit, which
means that they are exempt from conscious attention and reasoning."); see also PAUL BURSTEIN,
DISCRIMINATION, JOBS AND POLITICS ch. 1 (1987) (describing how the model for Title VII was
developed in the 1940's and never revisited when Title VII was actually passed in 1964, even
though there were other ways to frame the issues). In the psychological literature, this phenomenon
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in response to an immediate crisis tends to miss large pieces of the
problem and as a result can ultimately make matters worse rather than
better.60 The brownfields problem is a case in point. Particularly in
1980, but also in 1986, Congress, with considerable assistance from
EPA,6" framed its legislative project in terms of cleaning up
"dangerous" sites such as Love Canal and the Valley of the Drums,

rather than as a broader response to widespread land contamination.62
This narrow framing of the legislative mission was reinforced by media
events and public hysteria that surrounded the discovery of Love Canal,

Times Beach, and other high contamination, high exposure sites.63 Yet

may resemble "anchoring," where people anchor to their initial perceptions and, when confronted
with additional information, adjust their conclusions only very slightly around their initial
anchoring point. See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: UnderstandingPerceivedRisk,
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 481-82 (Daniel Kahneman et
al. eds. 1982); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristicsand
Biases in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURSTIcs AND BIASES at 3, 14.
'"See generally Rabe, supra note 14, at 580 (discussing detrimental impact on longterm hazardous waste cleanups resulting from Congress' tenacious conviction in 1980 and 1986
that "the problem of abandoned dumps [could) be resolved relatively quickly and definitively.").
This incomplete policy focus is exacerbated when there is a paucity of data or
information from which to become better informed. In 1980 there was apparently little data on the
extent of land contamination problems. ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY
DmSION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
COMPREHENsIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980
(SUPERFUND), PUBLIC LAw 96-510 66 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter I LEG. HISTORY OF
SUPERFUND] ("We have what is obviously a very weak data base simply because the deposit of
these types of materials on the landscape was neither under State nor Federal control.") (statement
of EPA Assistant Administrator Thomas C. Jorling). This makes it more difficult to anticipate the
magnitude of the brownfields ULCER, although the likelihood that there was a range in the extent
of contamination found on old industrial lands (ranging from little contamination to the Love
Canal situation) again is intuitively obvious, albeit not quantifiable.
6
See supranotes 53-55 and accompanying text.
62
The legislative history ofCERCLA, particularly in 1980, is replete with commentary
that emphasizes Congress' focus on dangerous sites and the urgent situation they present. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 4 ENVIRONMENTAL LAw" HAZARDOUS WASTES AND SUBSTANCES §
8.1, at 471 (1994) (describing how the "legislative materials on Superfund give prominence to the
hazardous waste dump sites that have become household words- Love Canal"); I LEG. HISTORY
OF SUPERFUND, supranote 60, at 55 (Chairman Culver of the Senate Subcommittee on Resource
Protection and Environmental Pollution outlines the purpose of his subcommittee's hazardous
waste hearings and focuses his remarks on dangerous sites, using as his primary illustration Love
Canal) (opening statement of Senator Culver). See also 126 CONG. REC. 30,940 (1980) ("across
this country, Mr. President, there is a toxic time bomb ticking. It is ticking and it leads, if not to
explosions and fatalities in an immediate sense, to a slow death of being exposed to toxic
chemicals over many years.") (statement of Senator Bradley); id. at 30,971 ("The time has come
to create the capability to clean up and monitor the dangerouswaste sites and spills that beset our
communities and people.") (emphasis added) (statement of Senator Chafee).
3
' See, e.g., id. at 30,945 ("Hazardous waste disposal .... is a subject which public
officials often discuss in inflammatory terms. But by creating headlines for themselves, they also
In many States where illicit dumping has
succeed in creating anxiety among the people ....
occurred, citizens live in fear that their community will be the next Love Canal or Valley of the
Drums.") (statement of Senator Danforth).
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6
aside from minimal and very general naysaying by a few legislators,
few, if any, concerns were raised within Congress about the relatively
narrow focal point of the legislation, particularly given the expansive65
definitions and liability scheme employed to reach that goal.
Moreoveri virtually no publicly visible attention appeared to be
dedicated to exploring whether these unprecedented liability rules
might backfire for cleanups not under federal control because of the
lower levels of contamination."
The hurried nature of congressional deliberations on CERCLA
further aggravated the narrow focus of Congress' analysis. Although
this speedy pace is not uncommon in environmental-law making,67 the
original CERCLA statute may win at least runner-up for the "speed of
lightening bill" award. 68 The final bill moved so quickly in 1980, for

"See, e.g., id at 30,972 ("we are going far beyond what is needed to address the real
problem-that of abandoned wastes sites. I am concerned that the addition of this whole 'release'
concept will unnecessarily open the 'Pandora's box' of new regulations... which will not assist in
the cost-effective cleanup of waste sites but that will in addition merely provide jobs for more
bureaucrats at the expense of the consumers of America.") (statement of Senator Helms). The
House was understandably concerned about the expedited passage of the Senate's bill that, among
other things, contained a number of technical errors. See infra note 69.
5
Senators Domenici, Bentsen, and Baker prepared a formal statement for the Senate
Report on S. 1480 which seemed to come the closest to hinting at potential brownfields-like
consequences. These Senators targeted the broad definition of "hazardous substance," joint and
several liability, the possibility of an onslaught of Department of Justice litigation against
potentially responsible private parties, and the retroactive application of the statute as particularly
worrisome and urged that effort be expended to ensure a more focused response to the hazardous
waste problem. S. REP. No. 96-848, at 119-22 (1980).
Other contentious issues also took precedence. There was a great deal of debate, for
example, on whether or how to provide compensation to victims injured by general hazardous
waste sites. See e.g., Timothy B. Atkeson et al., An Annotated Legislative History of the
Superfund Amendments and ReauthorizationAct of 1986 (SARA), in SUPERFUND DESKBOOK 5
(1992) (noting that "[t]he most hotly disputed issue [in the House] was a proposal to enact a
federal cause of action for claims for injury from hazardous substances.") (footnote omitted).
These debates may have further diverted congressional energies away from the examination of
more apolitical issues such as the effect of the broad liability laws on urban redevelopment.
"Many of the deliberations on key issues in both 1980 and the 1986 amendments to
CERCLA were held behind closed doors. In 1986, for example, the House/Senate conference
report was carefully crafted to paper over these discussions. See, e.g-, Alfred R. Light, Deja Vu All
A Memoir ofSuperfund Past,NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1995, at 29, 31.
Over Again?:
67
Cf ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ETAL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND

POLICY 774 (2d ed. 1996) ("in the end the resolution of more than a decade of intense debate [on
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990] turned on political maneuvering in a conference
committee sometimes holding all-night meetings throughout the last eight weeks of the session.
Facing a drop-dead deadline, the conference committee met until 5:00 A.M. on October 22, 1990.
The result was a massive body of complicated legislation for which there is virtually no formal
legislative history because there was no time to prepare a conference report.").
"See generally FRANK P. GRAD, 3 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4A.0212][a],

at 4A-51 (1998) (reporting on how CERCLA "had virtually no legislative history at all, because
the bill which became law was hurriedly put together by a bipartisan leadership"). The Senate's
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example, that the House begrudgingly complied with the Senate's plea

not to amend its recently passed version of the legislation. 69 This
legislative "super-rush"7 was undoubtedly a result of the explosive
combination of high conflict (expansive liability provisions) and high
saliency (the frenzied public demand for hazardous waste legislation)
issues that the legislation sought to address,7" as well as the imminent
changes in the control of the Senate as a result of the recent election.72

"hold your nose and pass it" attitude is evident throughout the legislative history. See, e.g., infra
note 74.
The 1986 amendments are probably better suited to the Mr. Potato-Head award, see
infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text. There was a great deal ofextended deliberations on the
reauthorization of CERCLA, see Rabe, supra note 14, at 574, 576-79 (describing years of
deliberations in Congress before SARA amendments were passed), although ultimately in the
Senate most of the 1986 amendments, particularly those relating to the liability rules, were hurried.
See Light, supra note 66, at 30 (observing that the Senate Environment Committee markup was
a "repeat of the 1980-like rush to judgment on legal issues").
69
After being entreated to pass the bill unamended because of its political frailty, the
House complied. Exactly ten days after the Senate passed CERCLA by a 78-9 vote, the House
agreed to the same legislation by a 274-94 vote. The President signed it into law eight days later.
1LEo. HISTORY OF SUPERFUND, supra note 60, at VII. "The delicate nature of the compromise"
thus "explains the absence of a conference report." Id
The legislative history does reveal considerable turmoil by some Representatives over
complying with the Senate's request to pass their version of the legislation unamended. For
example, Representative Broyhill pleaded with others to amend the Senate bill because of its
numerous defects: "Ihave in my hand a three-page list ofvarious defects and technical errors that
are in this bill .... It just does not make good sense that we abandon our responsibilities as
legislators in this body and pass a bill which is technically flawed." Id at 785. See also id.at 78587 (listing errors, one ofwhich-uneertain liability without a causal connection between the liable
party and the source of contamination-relates to the brownfields problem); id. at 788-89
(highlighting technical errors in Senate's passed bill and arguing that the errors "are going to be
litigated and the courts are goingto have a field day in ridiculing the Congress on passing laws that
are vague, internally inconsistent, and using tools such as superseding laws which are in conflict
without any further guidance.") (statement ofRepresentative Harsha); id. at 803 (same sentiment)
(statement of Representative Snyder); id. at 819 ("This bill must be repaired before I can support
it. I shall vote against it because I won't accept an inadequate solution to a pressing problem. We
can do better and I think we should.") (statement of Representative Frenzel). The sentiment of
Representative Moffett, which echoes the urgency expressed by a number of Senators, ultimately
won the day: "Mr. Speaker and colleagues, how many of these Love Canal ticking time bombs are
going to have to go off and blow up in our faces before we act? .... Let us not let [our] consensus
be blown apart by flimsy excuses and petty procedural considerations and turf questions, and our
unhappiness with the other body." Id. at 817.
7
See, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. 30,946-47 (1980) (reprinting ofeditorials in Washington
Star and the71Wall Street Journal criticizing Congress for "Superfund Superrush").
See, e.g., id.; Rabe, supra note 14, at 575 (characterizing Superfund legislation as
both high salience and high conflict, and observing that in such situations Congress generally finds
"short-term, symbolic palliatives preferable to more exacting and controversial long-term
approaches").
72
See ILEG. HISTORYOF SUPERFUND, supranote 60, at VI (noting that the "subsequent
events during the lame-duck session [during which CERCLA was ultimately passed] were colored
by the fact that the Republicans would become the majority party in the Senate in 1981. It was not
at all clear, however, what impact that would have on the Superfund legislation.").
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Indeed, if anything, once a majority in both houses had formed in

support of the legislation, the goal became immediate passage rather
than maximizing deliberations and precluding the possibility of future

ULCERS. 73 As Senators Stafford and Randolph admitted in a letter to
Representative Florio strongly urging the House to pass the Senate
version unchanged: "The Senate has passed a bill. It is not what we

would have wanted under other circumstances, but it was the best we
could pass at the
could do at the time. In fact, it was the only bill we
74
again."
passed
be
can
it
believe
time and we do not
Exacerbating the narrow congressional focus and the absence

of in-depth policy analysis was the dramatic fragmentation of
committees responsible for putting CERCLA together, particularly in
the 1986 House deliberations on SARA. Barry Rabe has carefully

documented

the

extraordinary

committee

and

subcommittee

fragmentation that he argues caused significant incoherence in the final

"See, e.g., id. at 775 (letter from Senators Randolph and Stafford to Representative
Florio pointing out that "[o]nly the fralest, moment-to-moment coalition enabled [CERCLA] to
be brought to the Senate floor and considered. Indeed, within a matter of hours that fragile
coalition began to disintegrate to the point that, in our judgment, it would now be impossible to
pass the bill again, even unchanged."); Rabe, supra note 14, at 575 (observing that Congress
enacted CERCLA as a temporary program "expected to clean up abandoned sites in only half a
decade. It gave little thought to the enormous technical and organizational complexity of this
undertaking.").
A more cynical and perhaps also less accurate explanation for Congress' apparent
tolerance of ULCERs are the public choice sorts of motivations such as short term limits and
intervening causes (like EPA's implementation ofa statute) that allows them to distance themselves
from careless provisions and incomplete policy deliberations.
v11LEG. HISTORY OF SUPERFUND, supranote 60, at 775. From this majority's point of
view, then, the benefits of getting a hazardous waste law passed as quickly as possible apparently
outweighed whatever costs and other unanticipated consequences might arise from the legislation.
See also 126 CONG. REC. 30,945 (1980) ("Clearly, we have no time to lose. Hazardous wastes
are produced daily; we cannot put them on hold while we dally through deliberations.") (statement
of Senator Danforth); id. at 30,950 ("At this late date in the legislative session, the point is not to
quibble over every detail, but to find the best way to expedite a bill that has broad support.")
(statement of Senator Dole); id. at 30,970 ("The bill does not meet many of my original hopes and
expectations ... and, were it not for the seriousness of the problem and the need to enact
legislation this year to provide funding for mitigating the threat of chemical pollution, I would
consider attempts to rectify what I believe are deficiencies with the present bill.") (statement of
Senator Williams); id. at 30,971 (same sentiment) (statement of Senator Leahy); id. (same
sentiment) (statement of Senator Chafee). Even inthe House and in spite of the fact that a number
of errors were identified with the Senate's legislation on the House floor, see I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF SUPERFUND, supranote 60, at 783, 787, 805, some ofthose concerned with the errors
nevertheless apparently voted for the legislation. See ALFRED R. LIGHT, CERCLA LAW AND
PROCEDURE 17 (1991) (reporting, based on parts of the legislative history, that "[a] number of.
.. congressmen, many of whom voted for the measure, similarly decried the failure 'to follow the
normal course of the legislative process' and argued that 'this is legislating the wrong way'"'
(footnotes omitted).
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statute."' Five committees in the House worked largely independently
amending CERCLA.76 Each of these committees, as well as at least one
highly invested subcommittee, the Subcommittee on Commerce,
Transportation, and Tourism,77 were very territorial about their
jurisdiction and associated contributions. Multi-committee skirmishes
plagued efforts to develop a single bill in the House and carried over
into conference committee deliberations, draining precious deliberative
resources that were instead devoted to jurisdictional squabbling. 78 But
even more detrimental is the unfortunate political reality that no single
committee ever took complete control of the bill. This precluded not
only a more holistic consideration of the bill's overall impact on society,
both good and bad, but it also precluded a "responsible" party or
committee who would take the heat for any mistakes.79 Instead, the Mr.
Potato-Head approach to legislation-writing meant that each committee
added an arm, leg, nose, or eye, but there was no central authority to

make sure they fit together into a harmonious whole.
Finally, Congress' love of science as providing either perfect
answers or easy outs to controversial policy problems, depending on

how cynical one wishes to be,8" resulted in the wrong kind of

"See generallyRabe, supranote 14 (tying shortcomings in SARAto the fragmentation
of legislative decision-making in the House and to a lesser extent in the Senate). The House
consideration of the 1986 amendments to CERCLA are particularly infamous in this regard. See
LIGHT, supra note 74, at 22 (outlining the numerous House committees with partial jurisdiction
over the amendments and noting the "hodgepodge of conflicting provisions coming out of these
various committees... [that] complicated even the quest for a mark-up vehicle for the coming
flurry of floor amendments').
6
See Rabe, supra note 14, at 577-78 (describing work of the House Energy and
Commerce, Ways and Means, Judiciary, Public Works and Transportation, and Merchant Marine
Committees).
"See id. at 577 (describing subcommittee battles and the resulting compromise reached
by the House Energy and Commerce Committee).
'SSee id at 578 (describing squabbles between committees with regard to reconciling
the different bills produced by House committees and later with regard to "which committee's
conferees would have jurisdiction over provisions," as well as regarding whether the conferees
adequately represented the position of the full House).
"See id.at 575-76 (observing that the 1986 amendments, the fragmented congressional
system ofcommittees and subcommittees "fail[ed] to concentrate the responsibility for developing
[the amendments] on any single legislator or committee. Thus the members of Congress have
ample opportunity to take credit while evading serious, long-term policy questions and
responsibilities.").
'A review of the legislative history reveals a good deal ofsupport for the cynical view.
See, eg., Light, supra note 66, at 30 (recounting how in 1980 congressional "draftsmen
deliberately left numerous legal issues, such as the standard and scope of liability... for the courts
to resolve" and developed study groups to examine "unresolved issues" in partbecause these issues
were so controversial).
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delegations to EPA.8 1 Rather than task the agency with difficult but
necessary line-drawing on critical policy questions regarding when a
site is contaminated or clean, Congress framed these regulatory

decisions in predominantly scientific terms.82 Yet, by demanding that
these key issues be resolved predominantly with science, Congress set

the regulatory apparatus off in the wrong direction.83 To withstand
challenge, EPA either had to admit that the science provided only
partial guidance in its regulatory decision or it had to follow its
statutory directions and camouflage its policy decisions under a
misleading technical wrap. From the standpoint of administrative
efficiency, public participation, and even scientific integrity, however,
Congress' unrealistic expectations of science are quite costly.

"The 1980 directions to EPA in setting cleanup standards were extremely vague. 42
U.S.C. § 9604(c)(4) (1982) (directing EPA to select cleanups that provide "a balance between the
need for protection of public health and welfare and the environment... and the availability of
amounts from the Fund"). In response in part to the disappointing EPA record through the first
half of 1980, Congress established extremely detailed and complicated cleanup standards in the
1986 amendments. See infra note 83; see also Atkeson, supra note 65, at 9,23-26 (concluding that
"[establishment of detailed new mandatory cleanup standards in CERCLA § 121 is by far the
most important change made by SARA"). Both sets of directions, however, are overly scienceintensive insofar as they direct the EPA to balance "protection of public health and welfare and the
environment" with available funds, a balancing that presumes that both sides of this balancing
equation are capable of at least some rough quantification. See, e.g., Wagner, supranote 49, at
Part H.B. 1. (arguing that "protection of public health" mandates are generally so scientifically
uncertain that they leave the agency in an extremely vulnerable position).
2
The characterization of how to determine when a site is sufficiently cleaned up
provides a perfect example of this problem. See, e.g, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (cleanup can occur if
a hazardous substance is entering or threatens to enter the environment); i. § 9621(d) (specifying
vague, generally science-related guidelines for determining appropriate degree of cleanup); Oliver
A-Houck, Of BA Ts, Birds andB-A-T: The Convergent Evolutwn ofEnvironmentalLaw, 63 Miss.
L.J. 403, 428 (1994) (noting that Superfund statute's heavy reliance on "risk-based decisionmaking may yet bring it down.").
83 Infact, in the 1986 amendments Congress endeavored to duplicate its 1984 RCRA
amendments and tightly constrain EPA's discretion in setting cleanup standards. See LIGHT, supra
note 74, at 23; see also James J. Florio (D-N.J.), Congressas Reluctant Regulator:Hazardous
Waste Policy in the 1980's, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 351 (1986) (describing that in amending
RCRA and CERCLA, "Congress itself has had to assume the role of regulator, making some of
the detailed technical and administrative determinations typically left to the implementing agency"
because "Congress is no longer confident that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will
exercise such discretion as intended by Congress") (footnotes omitted). But like RCRA, these
administrative restrictions took the form of unrealistic, science-specific standards when both the
data and the state of the science was still very uncertain. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 49, at Part
II.B.1; see also RICHARD BARKE, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POuCY 162-63 (1986)

(observing how laws regulating hazardous wastes can suffer from demanding too much certainty
from science and technological fixes).
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Il. REFORMING THE ULCER PROBLEM

Many of the most publicized ULCERs, such as acid rain, land
disposal, and air toxics disposal, appear to suffer from similar
Poor framing of the
weaknesses in congressional drafting.
environmental problem, the failure of interest groups to be concerned
about the problem, hurried deliberations, committee fragmentation, and
an overreliance on science contribute to the development of each of
these ULCERs. Although the problems of brownfields, acid rain, and
land disposal of hazardous wastes would likely still exist even if
Congress had done a better job anticipating the problems, there can be
little doubt that earlier anticipation of these adverse consequences
during the legislative process could have greatly mitigated their

severity.'
These ULCERs also exact a high cost from society. In the case
of brownfields, for example, countless expensive conferences,
rulemakings, bills, and state laws and regulations have been undertaken
in large part to correct the unintended consequences of CERCLA. s5
The costs to communities and prospective and current owners add to
this total figure, possibly exponentially. The acid rain problem, for its
part, was an especially expensive mistake. After partially causing the
problem in 1970, Congress then turned around in 1980 and dedicated
over a half billion dollars to research the scope and extent of the
'Ruhl & Ruhl, supra note 41, at 425 n.39, take the position that "the harder Congress
tries to predict the outcome of its enactments and anticipate misfirings, the more 'mistakes' it will
commit." While this may be true in some non-obvious instances, it is not at all clear that had
Congress anticipated the brownfields problem in 1980, the legislation would have been more
fraught with errors than the current version. A basic commitment to the process of democratic
deliberations in fact leads to exactly the opposite conclusion. Even using Ruhi & Ruhl's own
analysis, a persuasive case can be made that had Congress dedicated more effort to considering
the foreseeable impacts ofthe Superfund legislation, such as the brownfields problem, the resulting
legislation would have been less rather than more complex. Rather than leaving the EPA, the
courts, states, and private parties to sort out vague liability rules-a situation that most certainly
leads to considerable complexity because of the multiple institutions that can weigh in on the
questions, better legislative planning for the brownfields ULCER could have led to less complexity
because the issue would be decided legislatively or because the EPA would have had explicit
authority to resolve such problems administratively. See, e.g.. Buzbee, supra note 18, at 88-90
(describing an improved situation with regard to the brownfields problem had Congress explicitly
authorized and funded EPA to institute an administrative approval scheme for nonNPL voluntary
cleanups). Better legislative work then should reduce the overall "structural complexity" of the
laws that Ruhl & Ruh] point out can be damaging to the integrity of a legal system. See Ruhl &
Ruhl, supranote 41, at 470-71. Presaging the brownfields phenomenon also could have lessened
the inequalities (e.g., treating nonculpable owners similarly, regardless of the level of
contamination on their property) that Ruhl & Ruhl suggest can ultimately doom a legal system. Id.
at 478-49.
85 See infra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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problem. 6 The expense of the Title IV amendments to the Clean Air
Act and their implementation at least equals this cost. Undoubtedly,
then, billions of dollars would have been saved had Congress
anticipated these problems before the legislation was passed.
At the same time, many of the most detrimental features of
lawmaking outlined in Part II, such as hurried deliberations, are also
beneficial since they succeed in producing some legislative outcome,
however imperfect. Reforms of congressional decision-making must
appreciate this and avoid their own unanticipated consequences.
Proposals to reform congressional deliberations must also be realistic.
Widescale changes to how Congress operates are simply not practical.
Congress also cannot be counted on to voluntarily institute additional
deliberative checks that only serve to highlight points of legislative
incompetence or carelessness.8 7 Thus, in searching for better ways to
anticipate the unwanted side effects of the environmental laws, one
must step carefully and incrementally.
Despite the complexity of legislative deliberations and the
inevitable risks associated with tinkering with such a complex process,
there do appear to be a few fruitful reforms that may begin to counteract
the ULCER problem. Some positive steps have already been taken.
The House of Representatives, for example, has worked to reduce the
number and overlap between committees and subcommittees." This
reform will assist dramatically in counteracting the Mr. Potato-Head
problem and may also minimize the inefficient slippage and
jurisdictional wars that drain congressional energies.
There are at least two additional steps Congress might take to
improve the breadth and depth of its policy analyses. First and most
incrementally, Congress could utilize its own institutional experts to
analyze proposed legislation (or even recently passed legislation) in
search of ULCERS. 9 The literature on those experts, such as the

aSee, e.g., Leslie Roberts, Learningfroman Acid Rain Program,251 SCIENCE 1302,
1305 (1991).

"7The tortured and still unsuccessful attempts to enact some form of campaign finance
reform illustrates this point in a different setting. See, e.g., A Movement with Legs, HARTFORD
COURANT, June 24, 1998, at A16 (describing campaign finance reform as a "long, ugly battle" that
might finally begin moving forward in the House).
'See, e.g., Michael Wines, UnderSenate Streamlining Plan, The Powerful Would Be

Less So, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5,1993, at A27 (describing Senate announcement ofreforms, including
slimming down the number of committees and referring to similar proposals soon to emerge in the
House).
'Following the elimination of the Office ofTechnology Assessment in 1995, the next
most logical source of internal expert assistance is the Congressional Research Service. Cf Philip
H. Abelson, Scienti/ic Advice to the Congress, in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVICE TO THE
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Congressional Research Service (CRS), reveals that they are eminently
capable of providing high quality, relatively objective advice quickly .9
With this modest, yet immediate assistance," members of Congress
who are concerned about these issues will be able to anticipate the
92
largest side effects simply by asking the right people at the right time.
A second, slightly more radical possibility is for Congress, or
even the Executive Branch, to institute a more formal ULCER screen
for proposed legislation. On the congressional side, all bills scheduled
for floor debate or even recently passed bills might be required to
undergo an abbreviated ULCER screening process performed by a
disinterested expert such as the CRS.93 The Executive Branch may also
see political and administrative benefits in instituting some sort of
ULCER screen as part of the President's decision to sign a bill or even
during an agency's subsequent implementation of the statute.' If the
PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, AND JUDICIARY 395, 397 (William T. Golden ed., 1988) (touting the
expertise of the Science Policy Research Division of the Congressional Research Service, which
"has a professional staff of thirty-seven who are expert in a wide range of scientific and
engineering disciplines.").
9°See, e.g., BRUCE BIMBER, THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE IN CONGRESS: THE RISE AND

FALL OF THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 98 (1996) ("Perhaps the most positive
conclusion one can draw from OTA's relatively short relationship with Congress is that captive
organizations of experts can provide depoliticized expertise-if institutional arrangements reward
it.").
"See, e.g., id. at 80 (characterizing CRS as "a Grand Central Station of information,
where a ceaseless schedule of questions arrive and are routed to the appropriate experts.");
Abelson, supra note 89, at 397 (observing that Science Policy Research Division of the CRS
"turn[s] out 100-200 reports a year with a median of 20 pages" and "respond[s] to some requests
with one- to two-page memos totaling about 500 a year" and that these documents "are prepared
with a fast response time").
9See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
9'Cf Richard J. Lazarus, The Neglected Question ofCongressionalOversight ofEPA:
Quis CustodietIpsos Custodes (Who Shall Watch the Watchers Themselves)?, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBLEMS, Autumn 1991, at 205, 234 (suggesting this same proposal (with OTA or GAO
providing the advice) with regard to reviewing the reasonableness of statutory deadlines prior to
implementation of a statute); John Copeland Nagle, Corrections Day, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1267,
1280-1316 (1996) (arguing that many "statutory mistakes... can be attributed to Congress being
sloppy, unthinking, neglectful, or wrong" and outlining ways, including instituting a "corrections
day," to remedy these legislative errors after they are made in the form of final, passed legislation).
'ln a recent article, Professor Andrews details the dearth of anticipatory planning
currently occurring within EPA and other public health agencies. Richard N.L. Andrews, LongRange Planningin EnvironmentalandHealthRegulatoryAgencies, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 515, 53235, 548--52, 578 (1993). This dearth of planning is particularly troubling given the prominent role
agencies can play in framing and informing legislation. See supra notes 53-55. Professor Andrews
offers recommendations for improving the state of anticipatory planning within the agencies. See
Andrews, supra, at 578-82. These recommendations alone might improve the quality of the
agencies' input into legislative deliberations. Theycould also be formally required by the President
in deciding whether to sign a bill or in early stages after a bill has passed into law, but before
serious implementation projects are begun.
In a slightly different but related vein, Professor Sunstein has advocated an amendment
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President initiated this formal analytical check, Congress might very
well reciprocate with its own improved ULCER screen in order to avoid
embarrassment. 9

These minor reforms are simply a starting point. There are
undoubtedly other modifications and improvements yet to be conceived.
Environmental law scholars have shown relatively little interest in

examining or reforming Congress' role in environmental law making. 9,
But with the hindsight of nearly thirty years, patterns of legislative
failure are beginning to emerge, patterns that seem not always to be the
best among the alternatives. More work should be done to provide
Congress with greatly needed assistance as it endeavors to develop

legislation for these highly complex social problems in the future.
IV. CONCLUSION
Brownfields are a problem that would probably not have
become as serious or as difficult to solve if Congress had conducted a
more rigorous policy analysis in enacting CERCLA. There are several
understandable reasons why Congress fails to be alerted to often
peripheral, but nevertheless serious adverse consequences of its laws,
but there also appear to be some modest, apolitical steps that can be
taken to prevent these types of mistakes in the future. This Article
seeks to initiate discussion about the ULCER phenomenon and about
how some of these seemingly preventable problems could be better
anticipated by Congress before the mistakes become law.

to the Administrative Procedure Act that requires agencies to consider risk tradeoffs, tradeoffs that
could in theory include ULCERs like the brownfields problem, at the administrative level before
a proposed regulation becomes final. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Health-HealthTradeoffs, 63 U.
CHI. L. RaV. 1533, 1537 (1996).
9
In fact, congressional scholars have recommended more generally that one ofthe best
paths to legislative reform is by "concentrat[ing] on finding organizational devices to encourage
the Executive to plan ahead in such a way as to represent the kind of values Congress favors."
James A. Robinson, DecisionMaking in Congress,in CONGRESS: THE FIRST BRANCH 292 (Alfred
de Grazia ed., 1966). The White House, through these analytical screens and checks, can thus
become a more active overseer of the legislative process.
'SSee, e.g., Wagner, supra note 49, at notes 3 and 4 and accompanying text
(highlighting lack of scholarly interest in Congress and citing the surprisingly few major articles
on the subject).

